Re: [SECURITY] CVE-2017-12621 Apache Commons Jelly connects to URL with custom doctype definitions.

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Re: [SECURITY] CVE-2017-12621 Apache Commons Jelly connects to URL with custom doctype definitions.

Benedikt Ritter-4
I would like to give kudos to Rob for handling this issue. The kind of dedication you put into fixing this issue and releasing a component that has not been touched for ages is what I’m looking for in PMC members.

Great work!
Benedikt

> Am 27.09.2017 um 15:05 schrieb Rob Tompkins <[hidden email]>:
>
> CVE-2017-12621: Apache Commons Jelly connects to URL with custom doctype definitions.
>
> Severity: Medium
>
> Vendor:
> The Apache Software Foundation
>
> Versions Affected:
> commons-jelly-1.0 (core), namely commons-jelly-1.0.jar
>
> Description:
> During Jelly (xml) file parsing with Apache Xerces, if a custom doctype entity is declared with a “SYSTEM” entity with a URL and that entity is used in the body of the Jelly file, during parser instantiation the parser will attempt to connect to said URL. This could lead to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. The Open Web Application Security Project suggests that the fix be https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XML_External_Entity_(XXE)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet#XMLReader
>
> Mitigation:
> 1.0 users should migrate to 1.0.1.
>
> Example:
>
> example.jelly
> --------------
> <?xml version="1.0"?>
> <!---
> Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
> contributor license agreements.  See the NOTICE file distributed with
> this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
> The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
> (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
> the License.  You may obtain a copy of the License at
>      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
> Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
> distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
> WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
> See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
> limitations under the License.
> -->
> <!DOCTYPE r [
>        <!ELEMENT r ANY >
>        <!ENTITY sp SYSTEM "http://127.0.0.1:4444/">
>        ]>
> <r>&sp;</r>
> <j:jelly trim="false" xmlns:j="jelly:core"
>         xmlns:x="jelly:xml"
>         xmlns:html="jelly:html">
> </j:jelly>
> --------------
>
> ExampleParser.java
> ------------------
> public class ExampleParser {
>
> public static void main(String[] args) throws JellyException, IOException,
> NoSuchMethodException, IllegalAccessException,IllegalArgumentException,
> InvocationTargetException {
> JellyContext context = new JellyContext();
> context.runScript("example.jelly", null);
> }
> }
>
> Credit:
> This was discovered by Luca Carettoni of Doyensec.
>
> References:
> [1] http://commons.apache.org/jelly/security-reports.html
> [2] https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/JELLY-293
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> To unsubscribe, e-mail: [hidden email]
> For additional commands, e-mail: [hidden email]
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Re: [SECURITY] CVE-2017-12621 Apache Commons Jelly connects to URL with custom doctype definitions.

garydgregory
On Wed, Sep 27, 2017 at 8:29 AM, Benedikt Ritter <[hidden email]> wrote:

> I would like to give kudos to Rob for handling this issue. The kind of
> dedication you put into fixing this issue and releasing a component that
> has not been touched for ages is what I’m looking for in PMC members.
>
> Great work!
>

+1

Gary


> Benedikt
>
> > Am 27.09.2017 um 15:05 schrieb Rob Tompkins <[hidden email]>:
> >
> > CVE-2017-12621: Apache Commons Jelly connects to URL with custom doctype
> definitions.
> >
> > Severity: Medium
> >
> > Vendor:
> > The Apache Software Foundation
> >
> > Versions Affected:
> > commons-jelly-1.0 (core), namely commons-jelly-1.0.jar
> >
> > Description:
> > During Jelly (xml) file parsing with Apache Xerces, if a custom doctype
> entity is declared with a “SYSTEM” entity with a URL and that entity is
> used in the body of the Jelly file, during parser instantiation the parser
> will attempt to connect to said URL. This could lead to XML External Entity
> (XXE) attacks. The Open Web Application Security Project suggests that the
> fix be https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XML_External_Entity_(XXE)_
> Prevention_Cheat_Sheet#XMLReader
> >
> > Mitigation:
> > 1.0 users should migrate to 1.0.1.
> >
> > Example:
> >
> > example.jelly
> > --------------
> > <?xml version="1.0"?>
> > <!---
> > Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
> > contributor license agreements.  See the NOTICE file distributed with
> > this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
> > The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
> > (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
> > the License.  You may obtain a copy of the License at
> >      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
> > Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
> > distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
> > WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
> > See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
> > limitations under the License.
> > -->
> > <!DOCTYPE r [
> >        <!ELEMENT r ANY >
> >        <!ENTITY sp SYSTEM "http://127.0.0.1:4444/">
> >        ]>
> > <r>&sp;</r>
> > <j:jelly trim="false" xmlns:j="jelly:core"
> >         xmlns:x="jelly:xml"
> >         xmlns:html="jelly:html">
> > </j:jelly>
> > --------------
> >
> > ExampleParser.java
> > ------------------
> > public class ExampleParser {
> >
> >       public static void main(String[] args) throws JellyException,
> IOException,
> >                                       NoSuchMethodException,
> IllegalAccessException,IllegalArgumentException,
> >                                       InvocationTargetException {
> >               JellyContext context = new JellyContext();
> >               context.runScript("example.jelly", null);
> >       }
> > }
> >
> > Credit:
> > This was discovered by Luca Carettoni of Doyensec.
> >
> > References:
> > [1] http://commons.apache.org/jelly/security-reports.html
> > [2] https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/JELLY-293
> >
> >
> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> > To unsubscribe, e-mail: [hidden email]
> > For additional commands, e-mail: [hidden email]
> >
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> To unsubscribe, e-mail: [hidden email]
> For additional commands, e-mail: [hidden email]
>
>
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Re: [SECURITY] CVE-2017-12621 Apache Commons Jelly connects to URL with custom doctype definitions.

Pascal Schumacher
In reply to this post by Benedikt Ritter-4
I agree this required a lot of dedication/work.

Thanks Rob!

Am 27.09.2017 um 16:29 schrieb Benedikt Ritter:

> I would like to give kudos to Rob for handling this issue. The kind of dedication you put into fixing this issue and releasing a component that has not been touched for ages is what I’m looking for in PMC members.
>
> Great work!
> Benedikt
>
>> Am 27.09.2017 um 15:05 schrieb Rob Tompkins <[hidden email]>:
>>
>> CVE-2017-12621: Apache Commons Jelly connects to URL with custom doctype definitions.
>>
>> Severity: Medium
>>
>> Vendor:
>> The Apache Software Foundation
>>
>> Versions Affected:
>> commons-jelly-1.0 (core), namely commons-jelly-1.0.jar
>>
>> Description:
>> During Jelly (xml) file parsing with Apache Xerces, if a custom doctype entity is declared with a “SYSTEM” entity with a URL and that entity is used in the body of the Jelly file, during parser instantiation the parser will attempt to connect to said URL. This could lead to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. The Open Web Application Security Project suggests that the fix be https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XML_External_Entity_(XXE)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet#XMLReader
>>
>> Mitigation:
>> 1.0 users should migrate to 1.0.1.
>>
>> Example:
>>
>> example.jelly
>> --------------
>> <?xml version="1.0"?>
>> <!---
>> Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
>> contributor license agreements.  See the NOTICE file distributed with
>> this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
>> The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
>> (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
>> the License.  You may obtain a copy of the License at
>>       http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
>> Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
>> distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
>> WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
>> See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
>> limitations under the License.
>> -->
>> <!DOCTYPE r [
>>         <!ELEMENT r ANY >
>>         <!ENTITY sp SYSTEM "http://127.0.0.1:4444/">
>>         ]>
>> <r>&sp;</r>
>> <j:jelly trim="false" xmlns:j="jelly:core"
>>          xmlns:x="jelly:xml"
>>          xmlns:html="jelly:html">
>> </j:jelly>
>> --------------
>>
>> ExampleParser.java
>> ------------------
>> public class ExampleParser {
>>
>> public static void main(String[] args) throws JellyException, IOException,
>> NoSuchMethodException, IllegalAccessException,IllegalArgumentException,
>> InvocationTargetException {
>> JellyContext context = new JellyContext();
>> context.runScript("example.jelly", null);
>> }
>> }
>>
>> Credit:
>> This was discovered by Luca Carettoni of Doyensec.
>>
>> References:
>> [1] http://commons.apache.org/jelly/security-reports.html
>> [2] https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/JELLY-293
>>
>>
>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>> To unsubscribe, e-mail: [hidden email]
>> For additional commands, e-mail: [hidden email]
>>
>
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Re: [SECURITY] CVE-2017-12621 Apache Commons Jelly connects to URL with custom doctype definitions.

Rob Tompkins
Just glad to help. And, it was fun to learn the CVE process.

-Rob


> On Sep 27, 2017, at 2:25 PM, Pascal Schumacher <[hidden email]> wrote:
>
> I agree this required a lot of dedication/work.
>
> Thanks Rob!
>
> Am 27.09.2017 um 16:29 schrieb Benedikt Ritter:
>> I would like to give kudos to Rob for handling this issue. The kind of dedication you put into fixing this issue and releasing a component that has not been touched for ages is what I’m looking for in PMC members.
>>
>> Great work!
>> Benedikt
>>
>>> Am 27.09.2017 um 15:05 schrieb Rob Tompkins <[hidden email]>:
>>>
>>> CVE-2017-12621: Apache Commons Jelly connects to URL with custom doctype definitions.
>>>
>>> Severity: Medium
>>>
>>> Vendor:
>>> The Apache Software Foundation
>>>
>>> Versions Affected:
>>> commons-jelly-1.0 (core), namely commons-jelly-1.0.jar
>>>
>>> Description:
>>> During Jelly (xml) file parsing with Apache Xerces, if a custom doctype entity is declared with a “SYSTEM” entity with a URL and that entity is used in the body of the Jelly file, during parser instantiation the parser will attempt to connect to said URL. This could lead to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. The Open Web Application Security Project suggests that the fix be https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XML_External_Entity_(XXE)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet#XMLReader
>>>
>>> Mitigation:
>>> 1.0 users should migrate to 1.0.1.
>>>
>>> Example:
>>>
>>> example.jelly
>>> --------------
>>> <?xml version="1.0"?>
>>> <!---
>>> Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
>>> contributor license agreements.  See the NOTICE file distributed with
>>> this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
>>> The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
>>> (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
>>> the License.  You may obtain a copy of the License at
>>>      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
>>> Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
>>> distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
>>> WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
>>> See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
>>> limitations under the License.
>>> -->
>>> <!DOCTYPE r [
>>>        <!ELEMENT r ANY >
>>>        <!ENTITY sp SYSTEM "http://127.0.0.1:4444/">
>>>        ]>
>>> <r>&sp;</r>
>>> <j:jelly trim="false" xmlns:j="jelly:core"
>>>         xmlns:x="jelly:xml"
>>>         xmlns:html="jelly:html">
>>> </j:jelly>
>>> --------------
>>>
>>> ExampleParser.java
>>> ------------------
>>> public class ExampleParser {
>>>
>>> public static void main(String[] args) throws JellyException, IOException,
>>> NoSuchMethodException, IllegalAccessException,IllegalArgumentException,
>>> InvocationTargetException {
>>> JellyContext context = new JellyContext();
>>> context.runScript("example.jelly", null);
>>> }
>>> }
>>>
>>> Credit:
>>> This was discovered by Luca Carettoni of Doyensec.
>>>
>>> References:
>>> [1] http://commons.apache.org/jelly/security-reports.html
>>> [2] https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/JELLY-293
>>>
>>>
>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> To unsubscribe, e-mail: [hidden email]
>>> For additional commands, e-mail: [hidden email]
>>>
>>
>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
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>> For additional commands, e-mail: [hidden email]
>>
>
>
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Re: [SECURITY] CVE-2017-12621 Apache Commons Jelly connects to URL with custom doctype definitions.

Bruno P. Kinoshita-2
In reply to this post by Benedikt Ritter-4
+1 Amazing work Rob! Kudos!
Bruno

Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android
 
  On Thu, 28 Sep 2017 at 0:29, Benedikt Ritter<[hidden email]> wrote:   I would like to give kudos to Rob for handling this issue. The kind of dedication you put into fixing this issue and releasing a component that has not been touched for ages is what I’m looking for in PMC members.

Great work!
Benedikt

> Am 27.09.2017 um 15:05 schrieb Rob Tompkins <[hidden email]>:
>
> CVE-2017-12621: Apache Commons Jelly connects to URL with custom doctype definitions.
>
> Severity: Medium
>
> Vendor:
> The Apache Software Foundation
>
> Versions Affected:
> commons-jelly-1.0 (core), namely commons-jelly-1.0.jar
>
> Description:
> During Jelly (xml) file parsing with Apache Xerces, if a custom doctype entity is declared with a “SYSTEM” entity with a URL and that entity is used in the body of the Jelly file, during parser instantiation the parser will attempt to connect to said URL. This could lead to XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. The Open Web Application Security Project suggests that the fix be https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XML_External_Entity_(XXE)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet#XMLReader
>
> Mitigation:
> 1.0 users should migrate to 1.0.1.
>
> Example:
>
> example.jelly
> --------------
> <?xml version="1.0"?>
> <!---
> Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
> contributor license agreements.  See the NOTICE file distributed with
> this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
> The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
> (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
> the License.  You may obtain a copy of the License at
>      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
> Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
> distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
> WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
> See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
> limitations under the License.
> -->
> <!DOCTYPE r [
>        <!ELEMENT r ANY >
>        <!ENTITY sp SYSTEM "http://127.0.0.1:4444/">
>        ]>
> <r>&sp;</r>
> <j:jelly trim="false" xmlns:j="jelly:core"
>        xmlns:x="jelly:xml"
>        xmlns:html="jelly:html">
> </j:jelly>
> --------------
>
> ExampleParser.java
> ------------------
> public class ExampleParser {
>    
>     public static void main(String[] args) throws JellyException, IOException,
>                     NoSuchMethodException, IllegalAccessException,IllegalArgumentException,
>                     InvocationTargetException {
>         JellyContext context = new JellyContext();
>         context.runScript("example.jelly", null);
>     }
> }
>
> Credit:
> This was discovered by Luca Carettoni of Doyensec.
>
> References:
> [1] http://commons.apache.org/jelly/security-reports.html
> [2] https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/JELLY-293
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
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> For additional commands, e-mail: [hidden email]
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